

VZCZCXRO9652  
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV  
DE RUEHKH #0883/01 1670516  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
P 150516Z JUN 08  
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1047  
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE  
RHMFISS/CJTJF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000883

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON  
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [SU](#) [UNSC](#)

SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY ATTEMPTS TO BRIDGE UNAMID DISCONNECT WITH  
FORCE COMMANDER

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Special Envoy and UNAMID Force Commander aired shared frustrations in a May 31 meeting over the disconnect between UNAMID in Darfur and UN Headquarters in New York, a disconnect which led the Force Commander to declare that UNAMID had actually regressed in the five months since Transfer of Authority from AMIS. The Special Envoy pressed the Force Commander to identify the top challenges to deployment, which the Force Commander said were camp expansion and timely delivery of contingent-owned equipment. The two officials agreed to convene a meeting in El Fasher between the Force Commander, the Acting Chief of Integrated Support Services and FieldOff as a first step in formalizing a U.S.-UN mechanism for addressing immediate UNAMID deployment problems. Such transparency is supposed to exist between the USG and the UN Department of Field Support, but it is the very absence of this cooperation that is creating the disconnect between UN Headquarters and the field. Post recommends that the upcoming brainstorming session result in a tangible take-away to New York Headquarters that could perhaps herald the beginning of a new spirit of collaboration between the USG and the UN; see paragraph 13. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) Participants in the May 31 meeting in Nyala, South Darfur included: UNAMID Force Commander GEN Martin Luther Agwai; UNAMID Sector South Commander Brigadier General Fredrick Eze; UNAMID J5 COL Geir Haignes; Special Envoy Williamson; Acting CDA Powers; SPG Director Landis; Special Envoy Deputy Chapman-Gates; Special Envoy staff McKeel; Special Envoy staff Mohamed; USUN Military Staff Committee LTC Sadowski; and FieldOff Bruno (notetaker). USAID Darfur Team Leader Khandagle (ControlOff) and USAID Nyala FieldOff Richer were also present.

THE CHALLENGES TO 80 PERCENT DEPLOYMENT BY DEC 31

-----  
¶3. (SBU) In a May 31 meeting with the Special Envoy's visiting delegation, United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Force Commander (FC) Agwai revealed he was every bit as frustrated with the state of UNAMID deployment as was the Special Envoy. Agwai agreed with the Special Envoy that the gap between UNAMID, UN Headquarters in New York, Friends of UNAMID and UNAMID troop-contributing countries (TCCs) had to be bridged in order to achieve the mutual goal of increased troops on the ground. "I wish there had been a change since December 31, 2007 [date of Transfer of Authority from the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS)], but instead we're going downward," Agwai lamented, adding, "We're still the old AMIS."

¶4. (SBU) FC Agwai identified what he considered the greatest challenges to UNAMID deployment, concerns he said he had already voiced to the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) in New York. As in previous discussions, Agwai said that without camp expansion and faster means of moving contingent-owned equipment (COE) ahead of the rainy season, "there is no way we will make our deadline" of deploying 80 percent of UNAMID's mandated force strength by December 31, 2008. Agwai specified that no current UNAMID camp could accept

an additional 400 persons and that land in some areas had yet to be secured for camp expansion. Agwai declared that UNAMID at present had not a single self-sustaining TCC on either the military or formed police unit side, with the possible exception of South Africa. He flagged the need for more engineers (pointing out that the 140 from China currently in Nyala were all the Mission had to work with), as well as for Government of Sudan (GoS) clearance of engineering equipment into Darfur.

¶5. (SBU) To illustrate his points on the enormity of the challenges confronting UNAMID deployment, Agwai ran down the list of locations in Sectors North and South of the UNAMID Area of Responsibility (AOR) requiring new camp construction (El Fasher, Tawila, Mellit and Korma in North Darfur; Nyala, Sheiria, Muhajeria and Buram in South Darfur), and those requiring camp expansion (Zam Zam, Um Kadada, Kutum, Um Barru, Sarif Umra and Kabkabiya in Sector North; Kas, Khor Abeche, Graidia and El Daein in Sector South). Agwai added that the camp in Haskanita would require re-building as well.

¶6. (SBU) FC Agwai continued that camp construction and equipment deficiencies prevented arrival of new battalions, including the Egyptians in Um Kadada and the Rwandans in Korma, where the land had yet to be paid for and where the contractor had not yet moved equipment from El Fasher (a process with a four- to eight-week lag).

On time lags, FC Agwai pointed out that moving UNAMID equipment from Port Sudan to El Obeid took 40-50 days, followed by another two weeks to then move the equipment from El Obeid to Nyala for onward distribution. Agwai stated that UNAMID planned to fly sensitive equipment into Darfur during the rainy season but said that the Mission had only one Ileutian-76 and one C-130 available to do this.

KHARTOUM 00000883 002 OF 002

#### THE FORESEEABLE SOLUTIONS

¶7. (SBU) To address some of these problems, the FC reiterated his stance on the importance of reinforcing existing UNAMID battalions before tackling plussing-up incoming ones. In particular, Nigerian battalions 2,3 and 4, as well as Rwandan battalions 10,12 and 13, needed to be increased by 120 persons each. South African battalions in Kutum, Malha and Mellit in North Darfur needed 220 persons by June 8, and the Senegalese battalion in El Geneina, West Darfur, needed 262 more persons by June 8 as well.

¶8. (SBU) FC Agwai also stressed the need for increased engineering capacity, reinforced Movement and Control (MOVCON) capacity between Port Sudan and Darfur, reinforced Air Operations capacity, and increased inland road transport capacity. As items on his "wishlist," FC Agwai mentioned his desire to have consolidated scattered battalions throughout the AOR and a distinctive multinational character to the operation.

#### SO WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

¶9. (SBU) The Special Envoy noted that the FC's message, despite having been submitted to New York Headquarters only days earlier, had never been brought to the attention of the Friends of UNAMID or to the major donors who were anxious to play a more proactive role in meeting UNAMID's deployment needs yet who were inexplicably kept in the dark about the Mission's shortfalls by both DFS and IOT. He warned that UNAMID would suffer due to New York's failure to communicate, as would all of UN peacekeeping, and he pushed the Force Commander to cooperate even bilaterally to accelerate deployment as much as possible by December 31. "It's been three months since the launching of the Friends of UNAMID," the Special Envoy said, "and we have never once said 'no' to the UN."

¶10. (SBU) The FC could not explain why his messages were not reaching the major donors so that their funds could be channeled accordingly, but he promised to weigh in with UNAMID leadership to ensure that the Friends of UNAMID had a full picture of UNAMID deployment challenges. He also offered to ask the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to provide the USG with details of the UNAMID Enhanced Integrated Deployment Plan.

¶11. (SBU) The Special Envoy stressed the USG determination to nip UNAMID deployment problems in the bud, which it could do only when given enough advance notice about what these problems were. He noted that "candor of communication between DPKO and Member States isn't always what it should be," and suggested that the new Assistant-Secretary-General for DFS could represent a change in this regard [NOTE: Outgoing A/SYG Jane Holl Lute will nonetheless remain at the UN until August 1. END NOTE].

¶12. (SBU) The Special Envoy suggested that the FC, the Acting Chief of Integrated Support Services and FieldOff convene in El Fasher as a first step in formalizing a U.S.-UN mechanism for addressing immediate UNAMID deployment problems. This meeting will take place during the week of June 9, when the FC returns to El Fasher from travel in West Darfur.

#### COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

-----  
¶13. (SBU) Sidestepping DPKO and going directly to the Force Commander for UNAMID information could be a tricky endeavor and is likely going to be difficult to institutionalize in an organization that adheres to lines of command and bureaucratic hierarchies. However, a formal alliance of the frustrated may be just what is needed to get the Secretary-General's attention and wake him up to the fact that the international community wants to see a return on its billion dollar UNAMID investment. Post recommends that the upcoming El Fasher meeting result in a tangible take-away that can be used as a basis for a new effort to encourage the UN in New York to be more forthcoming in its sharing of UNAMID information, perhaps even a letter to the Secretary-General proposing a more transparent means of information-sharing to keep major partners abreast of UNAMID issues as they arise. With a more sympathetic A/SYG for DFS on the way, the time just might be right to formalize a different kind of partnership with the UN, one that takes its cues from the field rather than from the 38th floor. END COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION.

¶14. (SBU) This message has been cleared by the Special Envoy's staff.

FERNANDEZ